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Rethinking the Funding of New Zealand’s 
Election Campaigns
Andrew Geddis
The 2005 general election campaign was notable not only 
for its close-fought nature, but also for a range of deeply 
concerning, and in some cases undoubtedly unlawful, 
behaviour by various electoral participants. The Labour 
Party exceeded the statutory maximum on its ‘election 
expenses’ by at least $418,603, primarily due to the costs 
associated with producing and distributing its pledge 
card to voters. Furthermore, the use of parliamentary 
funding to pay for this campaign material prompted 
a post-election review by the auditor-general, which 
revealed widespread misuse of this source of funds by a 
range of parties and individual MPs (Auditor-General, 
2006). The National Party’s negligence in failing to 
account for GST when booking election broadcast 
time meant that it was able to screen some $112,000 
more in campaign advertising than the law allowed. 
Both National and Labour, and to a lesser degree some 
smaller parties, used anonymous donations and trusts 
to shield the identity of their major donors, allowing 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to fl ow into their 
campaign coffers from hidden sources. An extensive 
leafl et campaign funded by members of the Exclusive 
Brethren church and devoted to attacking the Labour 
and Green parties was carried out with a (still disputed) 
degree of knowledge on the part of the National Party, 
and on at least some occasions breached the legal 
requirement that they identify the ‘true identity’ of the 
person publishing them (Hager, 2006, pp.238-40). 
Other examples of ‘third-party’ advertising by various 
trade unions and the racing industry also appeared to 
contravene the rules requiring the authorisation of such 
messages and the identifi cation of their source. 
Taken alone, any of these matters would be cause for 
concern. In combination they reveal an urgent need 
for an extensive overhaul of the rules governing how 
electoral campaigns can be funded in New Zealand. 
The Ministry of Justice has completed a review of the 
present law, with the government signalling its intention 
to enact legislation dealing with the issue by the end 
of 2007. The National Party has also indicated that it 
is prepared to provide bi-partisan support for at least 
some reform measures. However, the exact nature of 
any proposals for change is not clear at the time of 
writing. This article is therefore intended to provide a 
background to whatever planned reforms may emerge 
by setting out the underlying problem involved with 
the issue of funding election campaigns. It then outlines 
the various regulatory choices available to respond to 
this problem. The diffi culties that the 2005 campaign 
caused for New Zealand’s present regulatory scheme are 
then recounted, along with some suggestions for how 
these may be combatted. Shortcomings with the present 
method of enforcing the rules on election campaign 
funding are examined. Finally, the article concludes with 
some suggestions as to how the process of reforming the 
rules in this area should be approached.
Election campaign funding and its 
discontents
When viewed in an international context, the events 
at the 2005 election should not provoke surprise. The 
funding of election campaigns has created endemic 
problems for representative democracies (Ewing and 
Issacharoff, 2006). This fact refl ects the Janus-faced 
nature of money in the electoral context. An adequate 
supply of cash is essential for running an effective 
campaign. All the elements of modern electioneering 
– producing campaign material, distributing advertising 
messages, conducting opinion polls, hiring campaign 
staff, candidate travel, etc – come at a cost. Without 
money to meet these costs, a party or individual 
candidate simply cannot reach the voters to persuade 
them of how to cast their ballots. Spending on election 
campaigns can thus be a positive good, in terms of 
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informing the electorate about the various parties and 
individuals seeking their support at the polls. 
However, money is not distributed equally in our (or 
any) society. Simply put, some persons and groups have 
much, much more of it than do others. The importance 
of money at election time can then give them a great deal 
of potential infl uence over the outcome of the contest. 
At worst this infl uence may take the form of a direct, 
quid pro quo donation for a desired policy outcome: 
the outright purchase of public decision-making 
power through the funding of an election contestant’s 
campaign. Even without such overt corruption, however, 
the very idea that an individual or group’s electoral 
infl uence refl ects their wealth is still troubling. It sits 
uneasily with our society’s commitment to electoral 
equality, as made manifest in the ‘one person, one vote’ 
standard. The right of the wealthy to cast multiple votes 
based on their property holdings was abolished well 
over a century ago precisely because each individual’s 
say about how the country should be run is considered 
as important as all others’, irrespective of how much or 
little they own. Additionally, should ‘money politics’ 
come to be seen to dominate the country’s elections, 
there is a risk that voters will become disillusioned 
and feel disenfranchised by the process. In an era of 
already declining turnout rates and falling political 
party membership, any development that might further 
decrease popular electoral participation deserves close 
and critical scrutiny.
Because money is both necessary for and potentially 
harmful to the electoral process, every democracy 
requires rules to govern how it can and cannot be 
used for campaign purposes. The form those rules will 
take then depends upon a number of factors (Ewing 
and Issacharoff, 2006, pp.6-7). One is the perceived 
importance of the issue in a society’s particular context. 
For example, New Zealand’s relatively low-cost 
electioneering environment, generally non-corrupt 
governing processes, and absence of any galvanising 
event or scandal has long permitted it to maintain 
a relatively ‘light touch’ regulatory environment. A 
second factor is the perceived political benefi t that any 
particular regulatory regime may provide to the various 
parties in Parliament. The rules governing election 
funding are chosen by MPs, who will then campaign 
for re-election under those rules. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that a degree of partisan calculation will 
accompany any decision as to what rules ought to be 
in place. Finally, every regulatory regime must strike a 
balance between the fundamental freedom of electoral 
participants to communicate with the voters and the 
equality concerns that campaign spending can generate. 
Different democratic societies have come to opposing 
conclusions as to the most appropriate balance within 
their particular cultural and constitutional context 
(Geddis, 2001a).
Furthermore, a range of differing policy tools are 
available to achieve the appropriate balance between 
individual freedom and participant equality. These 
various tools can be grouped under three general 
categories of regulatory response.
1: Supply side controls on election funding
The fi rst set of regulatory responses can be termed 
supply side controls. These restrict the way that primary 
participants may raise money from private sources 
for the purpose of funding their election campaign. 
By controlling how the electoral participants gain the 
funds needed to run their campaigns, these measures 
are intended to mitigate the risk that the interests and 
policy preferences of those with money to give will 
receive a disproportionate amount of attention from 
those seeking election. Such supply side controls include 
requirements to publicly disclose the sources of an 
election participant’s funding, and restrictions on who 
may provide donations, as well as on how much may 
be donated to an election participant by any individual 
supporter.
2: Demand side controls on election funding
The second set of regulatory responses can be termed 
demand side controls, involving caps on how much the 
election participants can spend on their election-related 
activities. The aim of this form of regulation is not to 
create complete equality between all electoral contestants 
– a gap will still remain between the resources available to 
various electoral participants, even with some spending 
cap in place – but rather to prevent a well-funded 
participant from ‘buying’ an election by outspending 
the competition by a large amount. Furthermore, by 
controlling overall electoral spending, such caps seek 
to reduce the ‘arms-race’ phenomenon, whereby every 
electoral participant seeks to raise as much funding as 
is possible in case an opponent proves able to raise and 
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identity is not ‘known’ to the party, the contribution 
is listed only as coming from an anonymous source. 
In 2005 the Labour Party received $275,000 by way 
of such ‘anonymous’ donations. Where a contribution 
is received via a conduit organisation, such as a trust 
entity, the party’s report need only list that conduit 
organisation as the donor. In 2005 the National Party 
received $1,741,793 from such sources. The law also 
permits a single donation to be split amongst several 
‘straw donors’, thereby causing each purported donor’s 
share to fall beneath the threshold at which disclosure is 
required. Furthermore, it is entirely legal for a donor and 
a political party (or individual candidate) to actively plan 
how one of these stratagems will be used to pass along 
a contribution ‘facelessly’ – that is, make a donation in 
a manner that does not involve the public disclosure of 
the donor’s identity.
These disclosure rules are inadequate in two ways 
(Geddis, 2001b). First, they require public disclosure 
only after the election has taken place. Consequently, 
voters remain in the dark during an election campaign 
as to who is supporting each party fi nancially in its bid 
to win public power. While an effective post-election 
disclosure regime has value in respect to tackling undue 
donor infl uence, it would be preferable to also allow 
voters the chance to assess this matter prior to casting 
their votes. Second, the ability of political parties 
(as well as individual candidates) to receive ‘faceless’ 
donations allows any donor who wishes to avoid publicly 
disclosing his or her identity to do so, and even permits 
the intended recipient of a political donation to advise a 
donor on how to achieve this result. The result is that the 
current public disclosure regime for political donations 
is all but voluntary in application.
This state of affairs is indefensible. The basic reason 
for requiring the disclosure of the identity of a political 
party’s large donors is to combat any potential quid pro 
quo arrangement by enabling the public to judge the 
extent of the donor’s infl uence on the actions of the 
party’s representatives. A disclosure system that enables 
large donors to easily (and lawfully) remain ‘faceless’ 
hamstrings its very purpose – it is hardly likely that a 
donor expecting some pay-off for his or her contribution 
will choose to identify themselves to the public. Further, 
the present system of disclosure lets the public see that the 
political parties are receiving hundreds of thousands of 
dollars from private sources (thus raising concerns about 
spend substantially more. Demand side controls may 
apply to the electoral participants’ total spending at 
election time, or to some more limited range of expenses 
(such as election advertising, or broadcasting). Further, 
they may apply only to the immediate contestants (i.e. 
the candidates and their political parties), or to a wider 
range of interested ‘third parties’ that involve themselves 
in the campaign.
3: Public assistance measures for electoral 
participants
The third set of responses can be termed public assistance 
measures. They complement the egalitarian objective 
of the previous two forms of regulation by replacing 
the role that private (and thus unequally distributed) 
sources of wealth can play in the electoral process with a 
‘clean’ source of funding – the general taxpayer. Further, 
such measures may be designed to provide funding to 
parties or candidates which otherwise would struggle to 
raise private funds, thereby enabling a greater range of 
voices to participate at the election. A variety of different 
forms of public assistance measures are available: direct 
payments to electoral participants on a ‘dollar-per-votes’ 
basis; post-election refunds of the expenses incurred in 
campaigning; matching donations for small, individual 
donations; tax credits to compensate small donors for 
their gift; the provision of broadcasting time or other 
campaign benefi ts to qualifying contestants.
The need for election funding reform in 
New Zealand
The events of the 2005 election demonstrate fl aws in 
every aspect of the regulatory regime governing the 
funding of election campaigns in New Zealand (for 
a more complete description of the present rules, see 
Geddis, 2004a).
1: Supply side problems
The lack of transparency involved in the supply of money 
to electoral participants is perhaps the most serious 
shortcoming in New Zealand’s current regulatory regime 
(Geddis, 2001b). The Electoral Act 1993 does require 
that the identity and address of donors giving $10,000 
or more to a political party be reported annually to the 
Electoral Commission.1 However, where the donor’s 
1 Donations of $1,000 or more to an individual candidate must be 
disclosed to the chief electoral offi cer following the election.
V
ol
um
e 
3,
 N
um
be
r 
1 
20
07
6
what may be expected in exchange for this largesse), but 
prevents them from checking what effect those donations 
have on policy. This is hardly a recipe for increasing the 
public’s overall confi dence in the political process.
In light of these problems, New Zealand should follow 
the example of Australia, Canada, the United States and 
the United Kingdom and require political parties (as 
well as individual candidates) to ascertain and publicly 
reveal the true identity of every donor who gives more 
than a nominal amount (say, $300). This was the 
approach recommended by the Royal Commission on 
the Electoral System, which also called for preventing 
the use of conduit organisations to avoid the disclosure 
requirements (Royal Commission, 1986, pp.189-90). 
The splitting of donations amongst ‘straw’ donors also 
should be prohibited (although lowering the required 
level of disclosure would itself undermine this tactic). 
Furthermore, the regular public disclosure of large 
donations (say, over $5,000) should be required prior 
to the election, so that voters are able to ascertain before 
casting their ballots who is fi nancially backing the parties 
and individual candidates. 
Aside from reforming the disclosure requirements for 
donations, thought is also needed as to whether limits 
should be placed on who may fund electoral participants, 
and how much they may donate. At present, any person 
or organisation can give as much money as he, she or it 
wishes to any political party or candidate. Contributors 
need not be citizens, nor even residents, of New Zealand. 
The legitimacy of persons who are not eligible to vote in 
this country’s elections funding those who are contesting 
them is debatable, to say the least. Similar considerations 
apply to contributions to electoral contestants from 
organisations such as companies or unions. Finally, it 
may be questioned whether even individual supporters 
ought to be permitted to make unlimited donations 
to parties or candidates. The concern is that reliance 
on large fi nancial backers can have a detrimental effect 
on the internal policy development and direction 
of a party, as well as creating a sense of obligation 
towards the donor. It is for these reasons that both 
Canada and the United States have banned donations 
to electoral participants from foreign citizens, unions 
and companies, as well as imposed caps on how much 
individuals may donate in any year.
However, such donation caps raise at least three 
potential problems. First, they infringe on the right of 
donors to use their fi nancial resources to promote their 
political beliefs through supporting particular parties or 
candidates. What is an appropriate restriction to place 
on a supporter’s ability to contribute money when there 
is no legal limit on the number of hours an individual 
may volunteer to work for an electoral contestant? 
Second, if restrictions are placed upon private sources 
of funding, it raises the question as to how electoral 
contestants will raise the money they need to mount 
effective campaigns. If suffi cient funds cannot be raised 
by lawful means from private sources, then public 
funding may be required instead, an issue which raises 
its own set of problems (discussed below). Finally, there 
is the problem of displacement of political spending. If 
private donors are prevented from giving money directly 
to the electoral participants, they may instead use their 
cash to fund ‘third-party’ campaigns around the election 
(an issue further discussed in the next section).
2: Demand side problems
New Zealand traditionally has used demand side controls 
as its primary form of election funding regulation. A cap 
applies to the ‘election expenses’ that political parties and 
individual candidates may incur in the three months 
leading up to the election.2 Similarly, the amount that 
may be spent on using the broadcast media to screen 
‘election programmes’ (i.e. campaign advertisements) is 
strictly limited through the broadcast allocation process 
carried out by the Electoral Commission. Restrictions 
also apply to election spending by ‘third parties’: 
individuals or organisations not directly contesting 
the election, but with an interest in infl uencing its 
outcome. Any advertising paid for by third parties that 
‘is used or appears to be used to promote or procure the 
election of a constituency candidate’, or ‘encourages or 
persuades or appears to encourage or persuade voters to 
vote for a party’, must be authorised in writing by the 
party or candidate concerned.3 The effi cacy of each of 
these forms of demand side control may be questioned 
following the 2005 election.
2 For individual candidates, the cap is $20,000. For political parties 
it is $1 million + $20,000 for each electorate contested by the party 
(i.e. a party contesting all 69 electorates may spend up to $2.38 
million on its ‘election expenses’). 
3 Where such authorisation is given, the party or candidate must 
then count that spending as a part of its own ‘election expenses’. 
In addition, the advertising must carry the ‘true name’ and address 
of the person authorising it.
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Most obviously, the fact that the Labour Party exceeded 
the cap on its election expenses by at least $400,000 
without facing any legal consequences puts the limit’s 
effectiveness in doubt. The overall issue of enforcing 
the rules on election campaign funding is discussed 
later in this article. However, beyond problems with 
policing the present spending limits, there is also reason 
to be concerned about their reach. Current restrictions 
apply only to ‘election expenses’, which include only 
advertising activities designed to promote a political 
party or candidate’s chances of being elected. Because 
activities such as opinion polling, travel, consultant fees, 
etc do not count as ‘election expenses’, unlimited sums 
may be spent on them. In practice, then, the electoral 
contestants may spend vastly more on their campaigns 
than the apparently low limits provide. It is not clear, 
therefore, whether this regulatory control is adequate 
to stop the development of an ‘arms race’ in election 
spending. Certainly, both Canada and the United 
Kingdom require that electoral contestants include a far 
wider range of expenditures under their election caps 
(Ghaleigh, 2006).
The present cap on spending on election broadcasting 
is also problematic. It is not clear why a separate limit 
is even required, given the overall limits on ‘election 
expenses’. In addition, because parties may only spend 
as much on election broadcasting as they are allocated 
by the Electoral Commission before the election, there 
is a large discrepancy between the ability of smaller 
and larger parties to access this medium. In 2005, for 
instance, Labour was entitled to spend $1.1 million on 
broadcasting its campaign advertisements, while the 
ACT, Green, New Zealand First and United Future 
parties could spend only $200,000 each. Whether it is 
legitimate for the law to mandate that one party will get 
fi ve times more direct broadcast media exposure than its 
competitors is highly debatable (Geddis, 2003). 
Finally, the controls placed on third-party election 
spending present a real difficulty. The current 
authorisation requirements for messages that appear 
to promote or encourage support for a political party 
or candidate only cover ‘express advocacy’: messages 
that explicitly urge voters to vote for some identifi ed 
contestant. Consequently, third parties can spend as 
much as they wish on ‘negative advocacy’ (messages 
that attack or criticise a candidate or party) or ‘issue 
advocacy’ (messages that purport to discuss issues, 
even if intended to help a party or candidate).4 For 
one thing, this regulatory framework encourages third 
parties to engage in the kind of negative, attack politics 
so disliked by the general public and epitomised by the 
Exclusive Brethren church’s leafl ets targetting Labour 
and the Greens. Furthermore, the loophole created by 
allowing third-party ‘issue advocacy’ fatally undermines 
the limits on ‘express advocacy’, as was also graphically 
illustrated during the 2005 campaign. For example, 
various unions distributed leaflets ‘comparing’ the 
policy stance of differing parties on matters such as 
employment and education policy, with the clear 
intention of encouraging a vote for the Labour, Green 
or Progressive Coalition parties. Similarly, the racing 
industry’s ‘vote for fair tax’ campaign was a barely-
disguised attempt to increase National’s share of the 
vote (Hager, 2006, ch.13). However, clamping down 
on this kind of election-related spending brings to the 
fore the clash between participant freedom and equality 
outlined earlier. Closing ‘loopholes’ in the regulatory 
scheme means limiting individual and group (other than 
the candidates and political parties) participation during 
the course of the election campaign. Deciding whether 
this is a desirable step requires a careful balancing of 
our commitments to individual freedom and equality 
(Geddis, 2001a, 2001c; Geddis, 2004b).
3: The issue of increased public assistance
The auditor-general’s post-election fi nding of widespread 
misuse of parliamentary funding has produced calls to 
reduce the temptation that political actors will exploit 
this resource, by expanding the amount of direct public 
funding available for electoral campaign purposes. 
At present, direct public funding of the election 
participants’ activities is restricted to the $3.212 million 
broadcasting allocation. There are several arguments for 
why this limited form (and level) of funding may be 
inadequate. The Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System, for example, recommended that registered 
political parties should receive a bulk sum based on 
the number of votes gained by a party at the previous 
election (Royal Commission, 1986, pp.226-9). It 
claimed that this measure would alleviate fi nancial 
inequality between the parties and reduce the risk that 
large donors might exert unwarranted infl uence over 
4 However, the Electoral Act 1993 does require that such messages 
identify the ‘true identity’ and address of the person responsible 
for them.
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a party’s policy positions. Increased campaign costs in 
the following two decades, allied to the overall decline 
in party membership, only served to strengthen these 
concerns. In addition, it has been argued that a fall in 
private funding following any introduction of tighter 
supply side controls, such as more stringent public 
disclosure of the identity of individual donors, might 
require compensatory public funding. Simply put, if the 
New Zealand public wants to avoid its political parties 
being dependent upon a few large-scale donors to fund 
their activities, or even skirting the legal rules in order 
to obtain the money they need to operate, then it will 
need to provide the necessary funding through general 
tax revenue.
However, there are also potential problems involved 
in establishing any public-funding scheme (Geddis, 
2002). Its design will require careful attention, lest it 
entrench already established political parties against 
displacement by emerging political movements. Crucial 
to this issue is the support threshold at which public 
funding is made available to electoral contestants: a 
higher threshold privileges established parties, while 
adopting a lower threshold will increase overall fi nancial 
costs. On a more principled level, we must ask whether 
the taxpaying public should be forced into contributing 
fi nancially to political parties that cannot convince 
individuals to support them voluntarily. Furthermore, 
there is a risk that providing a stream of guaranteed 
funding might contribute to the further ‘cartelisation’ 
of the political parties (Miller, 2006). If parties are 
able to fund their activities substantially through 
direct grants from the state, then their leadership may 
become even more insulated from the infl uence of its 
grass-roots membership. Such an outcome would be 
of real concern in an era of already declining levels of 
party membership. 
There are, of course, means of trying to bring about the 
positive ends promised by public assistance measures 
while limiting any risks involved in their adoption. One 
is to combine only partial taxpayer funding for political 
parties with restrictions on how much private donors 
may contribute. Political parties would thus be forced 
to raise the extra campaign funds they may require from 
an extended pool of supporters, rather than being able 
to rely on a few large-scale backers. The way in which 
public assistance is provided can also be tailored to 
encourage parties to seek (and supporters to give) small, 
individual donations: by providing a tax write-off in 
the same way as gifts to charities, or by giving parties a 
matching amount for small contributions. Finally, there 
is the more invasive option of requiring that parties 
wishing to receive public assistance must fi rst agree to 
a set of standards relating to internal party democracy. 
These standards could set out an individual member’s 
basic right to participate in choosing the party’s offi ce 
holders and candidates, as well as take part in the 
development of party policy. However, bringing the 
regulatory power of the state to bear on the internal 
workings of the political parties raises its own particular 
set of problems (Geddis, 2005).
The problem of rule enforcement
Following the 2005 election, New Zealand’s electoral 
administrators reported 17 potential electoral offences to 
the police. However, the police subsequently declined to 
prosecute any of these matters, even after accepting that 
there was strong prima facie evidence that an offence had 
occurred in some instances (New Zealand Police, 2006). 
This failure to bring a prosecution even in a situation 
where the law clearly appeared to have been breached 
raises the general problem of enforcing the rules around 
election campaign funding. Simply put, there is little 
point in having a well designed and comprehensive set 
of rules to govern how money may be raised and spent 
at election time if those who break the rules are not held 
to account for their actions.
One response to this enforcement problem would be to 
transfer responsibility for investigating and responding to 
potential breaches of (at least some) matters of electoral 
law from the police to the electoral administrators.5 
The role played by the commissioner of Canada 
elections provides a useful template in this regard. The 
commissioner of Canada elections is a non-partisan 
offi cial appointed by Canada’s chief electoral offi cer 
(who is in turn appointed by, and reports directly to, 
the Canadian House of Commons), with the statutory 
duty to ensure compliance with Canada’s electoral law 
(Davidson, 2004). In carrying out this responsibility, 
the commissioner of Canada elections can investigate 
any alleged breach of the electoral law and decide on an 
appropriate course of action to remedy any infraction. 
5 There may still be some serious criminal matters – such as 
allegations of bribery or undue infl uence – for which the police should 
retain responsibility for investigating and prosecuting.
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Therefore, he or she has exclusive responsibility for 
initiating a prosecution under Canada’s electoral law. 
In addition, the commissioner of Canada elections may 
negotiate binding compliance agreements with electoral 
participants to remedy a breach of the electoral law, or 
seek injunctions from the courts to prevent an ongoing 
breach of the law.
Alternatively, if enforcement is going to be left in the 
hands of the police, steps need to be taken to ensure 
that they take this role more seriously than at present. 
One means of achieving this would be to raise the 
potential penalties for a breach of electoral law. At 
present, ‘illegal practices’ attract only a fi ne of up to 
$3,000, while more serious (but far less commonly 
alleged) ‘corrupt practices’ attract a possible sentence 
of up to one year in prison, a fi ne of up to $4,000, or 
both. Consequently, even if a prosecution is successful, 
the likely penalty at present makes it appear that it is 
not worth the time and effort involved. Additionally, 
the police should incorporate a ‘harm to the democratic 
process’ component when they are deciding whether to 
prosecute an electoral offence. That is to say, they should 
not treat a breach of the rules governing the funding 
of elections as being a kind of ‘victimless crime’. In so 
far as such breaches undermine the overall integrity 
of the election process, they threaten the legitimacy 
of our entire system of government. The enforcement 
agents’ attitude towards pursuing and prosecuting those 
who have broken the law governing election campaign 
funding should refl ect this fact.
How should reform be implemented?
To return to the beginning of this article, the 2005 
election has revealed problems with New Zealand’s 
regulatory scheme that require (and have been promised) 
urgent attention. At a minimum, the disclosure rules 
applying to donations, the present controls on third-party 
advertising and the method of enforcing the election 
laws all must be tightened considerably. Donations 
from foreign individuals and companies should also be 
banned, and serious thought needs to be given to whether 
companies, unions and wealthy individuals should remain 
free to make unlimited contributions to those contesting 
each election. My own view is that it is inconsistent with 
the broadly egalitarian thrust of our electoral processes 
to allow such unequal funding practices to continue, 
and that only donations from individuals should be 
allowed up to a limit of (say) $20,000. Finally, New 
Zealand should bite the bullet and accept that taxpayer 
funds are necessary to ensure that a range of suffi ciently 
well-resourced political parties continue to exist in our 
MMP environment. The optimum way to distribute this 
public assistance, I would argue, is by allowing individual 
donors to registered parties a tax write-off of up to $500, 
just as is provided to those who give money to charity 
(Geddis, 2002). 
That being said, the fi nal shape of any reform measures 
will inevitably be fi ercely contested. For one thing, any 
proposal will have partisan political implications, raising 
the spectre that its intention is to maximise the interests 
of the parties that designed it. But beyond calculations 
of electoral gain and loss, any set of new rules will also 
involve a trade-off between values of freedom and 
equality, upon which reasonable, well-meaning people 
may disagree. Consequently, the process of reform 
must ensure that the chances of partisan manipulation 
are minimised, while principled disagreements are 
recognised and debated thoroughly. In an ideal world, a 
process akin to the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System, or the recent Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform held in British Columbia, could be adopted. 
However, such processes are time consuming, and it 
is perhaps better to address this issue while there is 
momentum behind it. Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether parliamentarians would be prepared to allow 
control over the issue to slip out of their hands.
Therefore, the manner in which Parliament goes 
about examining and debating changes to the rules 
governing the funding of election campaigns is going 
to be particularly important. At a minimum, the 
process should be approached with the aim of getting 
as many parties to support as many of the changes 
as possible. Any rules enacted by a narrow majority 
will immediately raise concerns about partisanship, as 
will rules that are supported by the two major parties 
alone. Furthermore, the scrutiny of proposed changes 
by the justice and electoral committee will be critical 
to the overall legitimacy of the reform process. At 
present only the Labour, National and Green parties 
have members on this committee. Clearly, the other 
parties represented in Parliament will need to become 
involved in the scrutiny process by providing members 
for this issue. Furthermore, the committee could 
profi tably consider inviting submissions on proposed 
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legislation from a range of international electoral experts. 
Although every country is somewhat different, and a 
New Zealand solution is required for New Zealand’s 
problems, the experience of other nations can still be 
useful and instructive. And fi nally, there will be a general 
responsibility on the part of parliamentarians, the media 
and academics to ensure that the public is kept fully 
aware of what changes are proposed. For in the end, it 
is their electoral system that is at stake.
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